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ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: A NORMATIVE 
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO PHARMACIST 
CONSCIENCE CLAUSE LEGISLATION 
Joanna K. Sax* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the year is 2050 and an older gentleman with Parkinson’s disease 
hobbles up to the pharmacy counter to fill a prescription for a new drug that will 
help treat his ailment.  The pharmacist refuses to fill the prescription because the 
drug was developed through the use of embryonic stem cell research.  The 
pharmacist states that it violates his personal beliefs to fill prescriptions that are 
based on this immoral type of research.  The next person in line attempts to fill a 
prescription for HIV medication.  Again, the pharmacist refuses to fill the 
prescription because he thinks that the HIV positive person may have contracted 
the disease in a homosexual encounter and believes this type of behavior is 
immoral.1  The next woman in line attempts to fill her prescription for birth control.  
The pharmacist refuses and states that he is personally opposed to contraception.2 
Indeed, the last of these scenarios repeatedly occurred in the 1990s and 2000s and 
it is only a matter of time before the first two scenarios come to fruition.3  The 
failure to fill medical prescriptions may lead to serious medical harms.   
The issue is whether it is optimal for society to support legislation that allows a 
pharmacist to escape liability for refusing to fill a valid prescription based on the 
pharmacist’s personal beliefs, otherwise known as conscience clauses.  Currently, 
at least five states have pharmacist conscience clause legislation and many more 
states are considering such legislation.  This issue is particularly ripe as embryonic 
stem cell research progresses because this research is engulfed by many of the 
same controversies surrounding contraception.  As stem cell research progresses, 
many hope it will lead to the discovery and development of new drugs for a variety 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.  B.S., 1997, University of 
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 1. Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection—May Pharmacists Refuse to 
Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?, 351 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2008, 2010 (2004) 
(discussing the potential for discrimination against persons with HIV). 
 2. Joan Bray, Birth Control Is a Woman’s Decision, Not Her Pharmacist’s.  Some Refuse To 
Honor Legal Prescriptions on Moral Grounds.  We Must Remind Them That’s Not Their Job., ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 21, 2005, at B7 (stating that “pharmacists in this country increasingly are 
refusing, based on personal moral objections, to fill women’s lawful prescriptions for birth control”). 
 3. See, e.g., Noesen v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Regulation & Licensing, Pharmacy Examining Bd., 
751 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). 
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of diseases.  It is likely that pharmacists who object to filling prescriptions for 
contraception will also refuse to fill prescriptions for drugs developed through stem 
cell research.  Legal scholarship in this area focuses on applying notions of fairness 
to support or oppose pharmacist conscience clause legislation; however, this 
fairness-based approach appears to be at an impasse.  This Article proposes the 
application of welfare economics to analyze whether conscience clauses maximize 
social welfare.   
Over the past several years, many states introduced legislation that protects a 
pharmacist’s decision to refuse to fill a prescription.4  Termed “conscience 
clauses,” these pieces of legislation allow a pharmacist to refuse to fill a 
prescription because of moral or religious objections without fear of legal 
repercussions.  In 2006, for example, twenty-one states considered legislation that 
permits pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions; some bills focus on 
contraception alone, while others are not specific to any one type of medication.5  
Arkansas, Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, and South Dakota have state laws that 
provide legal protection to pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions.6  
Alternatively, Illinois, Massachusetts, and North Carolina have duty-to-fill laws 
that do not afford legal protection to pharmacists that refuse to fill prescriptions due 
to personal beliefs.7 
The current conscience clause legislation debate is largely focused on birth 
control.8  Increasingly, however, other types of research are engulfed by the same 
moral and religious arguments as those used against the reproductive rights 
movement.  Specifically, many similar arguments surround the therapeutic 
embryonic stem cell research debates.   
In 2001, the federal government placed a practical ban on the federal funding 
of therapeutic stem cell research.  In the ensuing years, numerous states passed 
legislation supporting stem cell research.  In the spring of 2009, President Obama 
                                                                                                     
 4. Marcia D. Greenberger & Rachael Vogelstein, Pharmacist Refusals: A Threat to Women’s 
Health, 308 SCIENCE 1557, 1558 (2005) (“Since 1997, 28 states have introduced legislation that would 
permit pharmacists to refuse to dispense, and sometimes to refer or transfer, drugs on the basis of moral 
or religious grounds”).  See also R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience—Refusing to Deliver 
Medical Care, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2471, 2471 (2005) (discussing the potential expansive application 
of medical conscience clause legislation, including therapy developed through stem cell research); 
NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, GUARANTEE WOMEN’S ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTIONS 1 (2009), available 
at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/files/Birth-Control-Pharmacy-Access.pdf (last visited Nov. 
11, 2010) [hereinafter GUARANTEE WOMEN’S ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTIONS].  
 5. See GUARANTEE WOMEN’S ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 4, at 7.  See also, 
Greenberger & Vogelstein, supra note 4, at 1558 (“Fifteen states have introduced such bills in the 2005 
legislative session alone.”). 
 6. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., PHARMACY REFUSALS 101 3 (Apr. 2010), available at 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pharmacyrefusals101.410.pdf; Cantor & Baum, supra note 
1, at 2008 (stating that these states have explicit laws to legally protect the pharmacists to refuse who 
dispense contraception medication).  
 7. Charo, supra note 4, at 2472 fig.1 (illustrating the states’ pharmacy policies). 
 8. See, e.g., Sarah Tomkowiak, Comment, Reconciling Principles and Prescriptions: Do 
Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Strike the Appropriate Balance Between Pharmacists’ and Patients’ 
Rights?, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (2007). 
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reversed the Bush Administration’s practical ban on embryonic stem cell research.9  
In July 2009, the government released embryonic stem cell research guidelines.10  
Many hope that with the injection of federal money and support it is only a matter 
of time before beneficial medical procedures and medications develop through 
stem cell research.   
Stem cell research raises numerous policy considerations that need to be 
analyzed as this research moves forward, such as compensation for donors and 
reproductive versus therapeutic stem cell research.  This Article argues that, among 
the many policy avenues that need to be addressed regarding stem cell research, 
one important area is patient access to prescription drugs. State legislators are 
attempting to pass conscience clause legislation that is aimed at stem cell research.  
A state senator from Washington, for example, introduced a bill to expand a 
conscience clause to include treatments discovered through biomedical research.11   
Specifically, the introduced bill stated: “Biotechnology may create new 
objectionable medical options in the future.”12  The introduced bill provided: 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person may be required to pay for 
or otherwise provide, directly or indirectly, any biomedical treatment, service, 
procedure, pharmaceutical, or technology to which that person has a bona fide 
doctrinal religious objection.”13   Although this bill did not become law, it provides 
a glimpse of the potential expansive nature of pharmacist conscience clauses.14 
The goals of this Article are two-fold: (1) to explain that pharmacist 
conscience clause legislation may be expanded to areas concerning controversial 
biomedical research; and (2) to demonstrate that welfare economics can be applied 
to analyze pharmacist conscience clause legislation.  Regarding the first goal, the 
broad language of existing and proposed conscience clause legislation creates an 
umbrella that allows a pharmacist to escape liability for refusing to fill a 
prescription for almost any type of medication.  With respect to the second goal, 
this Article applies welfare economics to demonstrate that pharmacist conscience 
clauses are a part of tort law and can be analyzed as such to determine whether 
social welfare is maximized.   
A legal framework is needed to ensure that patients receive their medications.  
Applying principles from welfare economics may allow states to acknowledge that 
conscience clauses are akin to a no-liability regime, and this may not be in the best 
interest of its citizens.  As a precursor, conscience clause legislation has no bearing 
on the pharmacist’s professional role in patient safety.  By applying welfare 
economics, courts or policymakers may determine that pharmacists should be held 
to the duty of care as established by the state courts or state licensing boards and 
                                                                                                     
 9. Exec. Order No. 13505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 
13505]. 
 10. Raynard S. Kington, Acting Director, Nat’l Inst. of Health, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 
GUIDELINES ON HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH, http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/2009guidelines.htm 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH GUIDELINES ON HUMAN STEM CELL 
RESEARCH]. 
 11. S.B. 5879, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003) (unenacted). 
 12. Id. § 1. 
 13. Id. § 2(1).  
 14. In addition, this bill did not receive a hearing.  Washington Votes, 2003 Senate Bill 5879, 
http://www.washingtonvotes.org/2003-SB-5879#aBillComments (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).  
2010] ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 93 
potentially subject to liability for a refusal to fill a valid and safe prescription.  If, 
however, the states continue to pass conscience clause legislation, then the federal 
government may decide to legislate or regulate a policy to protect patients’ access 
to prescription drugs.   
Part II of this Article explains the role of pharmacists as the gatekeeper for 
drugs.15  Pharmacists receive specialized education designed to understand drug 
pathways, interactions, side effects, and other important characteristics in order to 
ensure a patient receives an appropriate drug that will not interact adversely with 
other medications.  Pharmacists hold the responsibility to communicate with a 
prescribing physician if they identify adverse drug interactions or to clarify other 
issues surrounding prescriptions.16  During the past ten years, this country 
witnessed an expansion of the pharmacist’s role in dispensing prescription drugs, in 
large part due to refusals through conscience clause legislation.   
In Part III, this Article describes conscience clause legislation designed to 
protect pharmacists who refuse to dispense prescriptions.  These conscience clauses 
spurred a huge debate over the interaction of a pharmacist with a patient in the 
medical literature, legal scholarship, and popular press, and this Article will present 
the myriad of arguments on all sides.17  The current legal debate in this area applies 
principles of fairness to argue for or against conscience clause legislation.  In Part 
V, however, this Article argues that an economic approach— as opposed to fairness 
arguments—should be utilized to determine whether pharmacist conscience clauses 
maximize social welfare.   
Part IV considers whether the momentum of the state initiatives to allow 
pharmacists to refuse to dispense birth control could potentially be expanded to 
drugs discovered by controversial biomedical research.  Already, for example, 
some Catholic hospitals do not provide emergency contraception to rape victims 
for religious reasons.18  Furthermore, watchdog groups communicate to 
pharmacists promoting the use of conscience clauses.19  Because many of the 
arguments used to support anti-contraception positions are also applied against 
embryonic stem cell research, it is reasonable to believe that groups that advocate 
                                                                                                     
 15. William L. Allen & David B. Brushwood, Pharmaceutically Assisted Death and the 
Pharmacist’s Right of Conscience, 5 OHIO N.U. J. PHARMACY & L. 1, 2-5 (1996) (describing the role of 
pharmacists). 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 4-5; Sarah J. Vokes, Comment, Just Fill the Prescription: Why Illinois’ 
Emergency Rule Appropriately Resolves the Tension Between Religion and Contraception in the 
Pharmacy Context, 24 LAW & INEQ. 399, 406-07 (2006).  
 17. See, e.g., Cantor & Baum, supra note 1, at 2009-10 (stating the arguments against a 
pharmacist’s right to object); Donald W. Herbe, Note, The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate 
Protection of a Pharmacist’s Right to Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 
J.L. & HEALTH 77, 78 (2002-03) (suggesting measures should exist to protect “pharmacists from having 
to act contrary to their basic moral convictions”); Katie Fairbank, Waging a Moral Battle From Behind 
the Counter—Pharmacists’ Refusal to Fill Contraception Prescriptions Prompts the Question: Whose 
Choice is it to Make?, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Apr. 24, 2005, at 1A (quoting a Planned Parenthood 
Employee as saying “I can almost guarantee you those same pharmacies wouldn’t have an objection to 
Viagra”). 
 18. Deborah Weiss, Emergency Contraception—History and Access, at 4, 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/PPFA/EC_060309.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (describing 
the study of rape victims’ access to emergency contraception in emergency rooms). 
 19. See, e.g., Pharmacists for Life International, http://www.pfli.org/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).  
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for pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions for birth control will communicate 
information to pharmacists concerning drugs developed through stem cell research.  
This Article describes how some of the conscience clause laws are so broadly 
worded that they could potentially be applied to other controversial areas, in 
particular, medications discovered through stem cell research.20 
Part V of this Article provides that the application of principles from welfare 
economics may demonstrate that the protection from liability for pharmacists who 
refuse to fill a prescription due to the pharmacist’s personal or religious beliefs fails 
to maximize social welfare.  The application of welfare economics in this Article is 
a markedly different approach compared to the fairness arguments discussed in 
legal scholarship, medical literature, and the popular press.  In general, each state’s 
common law or state licensing provisions will set the professional standard of care 
for pharmacists.  Conscience clauses, however, statutorily protect pharmacists from 
liability when refusing to fill a prescription.  This Article suggests that pharmacist 
conscience clauses mimic a no-liability regime under tort law, which may fail to 
maximize social welfare.  Should the states continue to ignore the impact of 
pharmacist conscience clauses, federal oversight through legislative and regulatory 
measures may be enacted to ensure patients receive prescription drugs.  Duty-to-fill 
legislation, for example, introduced in the Senate21 and the House of 
Representatives,22 is one proposed alternative that requires pharmacies to fill 
prescriptions.  This Article proposes amendments to strengthen the proposed duty-
to-fill legislation.  
As we move forward into areas of controversial biomedical research, such as 
stem cell research, broadly worded conscience clauses can be applied to an 
increasing number of drugs.  Understanding the position of opponents to stem cell 
research in relation to the conscience clause landscape provides an opportunity to 
analyze and progressively address issues related to patients’ access to prescription 
drugs.  
II.  THE PHARMACIST’S ROLE AS A GATEKEEPER 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classifies drugs as safe and 
effective for use by one of two main mechanisms.  Drugs can be purchased as 
“over the counter” (OTC) meaning that the drug’s benefits outweigh the risks, 
potential for abuse is low, labels provide adequate information, and a person can 
self-medicate.23  The FDA classifies a second group of drugs as “prescription only” 
if they believe the drug could be misused under the self-medication regime 
                                                                                                     
 20. Cf. Angela K. Brown, Lawsuit Protection Helps South Dakota Druggists Bring Beliefs to Work, 
CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1998, at C2 (“‘They’ve been chipping away at Roe vs. Wade for years,’ said 
Thelma Underberg, South Dakota Director of the National Abortion Reproductive Rights Action 
League.  ‘They’re starting with what they can control.’”). 
 21. Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 778, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 22. Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, H.R. 1652, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 23. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., U.S. FDA, Regulation of Nonprescription Products, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/cder/ucm093452.htm (last updated Oct. 19, 2010). 
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described for OTC drugs.24  To receive the second class of drugs, a physician 
writes a prescription for a particular drug that must be submitted to a licensed 
pharmacist for dispensing.  In addition, pharmacists have a heightened 
responsibility when dispensing controlled substances, such as narcotics, because of 
the highly addictive nature of the drugs and the potential for abuse.   
A pharmacist is a medical professional.25  A pharmacist plays a role as 
gatekeeper to ensure prescriptions are written according to proper procedures and 
to dispense drugs with accuracy.26  First, a pharmacist can only fill a prescription 
written by a physician with the authority to prescribe that particular type of 
medication.  For example, if a patient changes doctors, a pharmacist is no longer 
obligated to fill prescriptions for a person once the doctor-patient relationship has 
ceased.27  Second, pharmacists review prescriptions for safety concerns such as 
adverse drug interactions, allergies, and incorrect drug for the disease.28  
Pharmacists consult with the patients about doses and side effects.29  If problems 
are detected, the pharmacist intervenes by contacting the prescribing physician.  
The pharmacist is part of the chain of patient care.  
The pharmacist gatekeeper functions relate to the medical needs of patients 
and it does not include an exception for moral, religious, or ethical objections to 
certain types of medications.  Without the protection of a conscience clause, a 
pharmacist may be held liable for failing to dispense valid and safe prescriptions 
due to personal beliefs.30  Indeed, as described in more detail below, some state’s 
conscience clause laws specifically provide protection for pharmacists refusing to 
fill prescriptions for contraception and assisted suicide.  Other states have broader 
conscience clauses that are not limited to specific classes of drugs.  In response to 
states with conscience clauses, other states, such as New Jersey, enacted legislation 
that places the responsibility on the pharmacy to fill safe and valid prescriptions.31  
                                                                                                     
 24.  Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, INFORMATION ABOUT THE PRODUCTS WE REGULATE, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/default.htm#Prescription%20Drug%20Information (last updated Sept. 27, 
2005). 
 25. See, e.g., Professional, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professional (last visited Nov. 
11, 2010);  Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines professional as: 
A high standard of professional ethics, behavior and work activities while carrying out one's profession 
(as an employee, self-employed person, career, enterprise, business, company, or 
partnership/associate/colleague, etc.).  The professional owes a higher duty to a client, often a privilege 
of confidentiality, as well as a duty not to abandon the client just because he or she may not be able to 
pay or remunerate the professional.  Often the professional is required to put the interest of the client 
ahead of his own interests. 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/professional. 
 26. See Vokes, supra note 16, at 406-07 (describing role of pharmacists); See also Claire A. 
Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of Refusal Clauses for 
Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 469, 512-13 (2006).   
 27. Allen & Brushwood, supra note 15, at 3. 
 28. Henri R. Manasse Jr., Conscientious Objection and the Pharmacist, 308 SCIENCE 1558, 1559 
(2005) (“Pharmacists also perform critical quality checks to detect and prevent harmful drug 
interactions, adverse reactions, and mistakes.”). 
 29. Allen & Brushwood, supra note 15, at 4-5 (describing the role of pharmacists under the 
Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act of 1990). 
 30. See Noesen, 751 N.W.2d at 393-94.  See also Smearman, supra note 26, at 512-13 (describing 
that state regulations enumerate the circumstances when a pharmacist should refuse to dispense a drug). 
 31. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-67.1(a) (West 2007).  The statute provides in relevant part: 
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The upshot is that traditionally a pharmacist is supposed to fill all valid and safe 
prescriptions for FDA approved drugs; however, the recent surge of state 
conscience clauses is changing the ability of a patient to receive their prescription 
drugs.   
III.  CONSCIENCE CLAUSE LEGISLATION AND THE ATTENDANT ARGUMENTS 
Following Roe v. Wade, the federal government and forty-six states enacted 
conscience clauses to protect medical professionals who do not want to perform 
procedures that are against their personal beliefs, most notably abortions.32  
Recently, multiple states enacted similar measures for pharmacists who may not 
want to dispense medication that is against their beliefs.33  At least five states have 
pharmacist conscience clause legislation34 and these conscience clauses can be 
divided into two groups.  The first group includes pharmacist conscience clauses 
that specifically enumerate the types of drugs that a pharmacist may refuse to fill.35  
The second group contains broadly worded conscience clause legislation that 
protects a pharmacist who refuses to dispense any drug that is against their personal 
beliefs.36   
Diverse opinions in the religious, legal, and medical communities argue along 
a continuum about these statutes.  Proponents of conscience clauses argue that 
these statutes are a welcome effort to allow pharmacists to exercise their personal 
beliefs.  At the other end, opponents argue these clauses are a major threat to the 
doctor-patient relationship and women’s rights.  Those in the middle see the 
conscience clauses as a balancing act where the pharmacist may exercise personal 
beliefs so long as another method, such as referral, is available to the patient.  
These arguments look at notions of fairness regarding the pharmacists and patients.  
In Part V, however, this Article argues that the application of welfare economics—
                                                                                                     
A pharmacy practice site has a duty to properly fill lawful prescriptions for prescription drugs or devices 
that it carries for customers, without undue delay, despite any conflicts of employees to filling a 
prescription and dispensing a particular prescription drug or device due to sincerely held moral, 
philosophical or religious beliefs. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1973) [hereinafter Church Amendment]; Holly Teliska, Obstacles to 
Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Undermine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-
Income Women, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 229, 233-34 (describing the history of refusal 
clauses); Smearman, supra note 26, at 476 (2006) (“In 1973, the same year Roe v. Wade was decided, 
Congress enacted the first federal refusal statute, known as the Church Amendment”); Leora Eisenstadt, 
Separation of Church and Hospital: Strategies to Protect Pro-Choice Physicians in Religiously 
Affiliated Hospitals, 15 YALE. J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 144-47 (2003) (describing the background of the 
Church Amendment).  See generally, Bryan A. Dykes, Notes: Proposed Rights of Conscience 
Legislation: Expanding to Include Pharmacists and Other Health Care Providers, 36 GA. L. REV. 565, 
569-85 (2002) (describing in detail numerous state conscience clauses for medical providers). 
 33. Greenberger & Vogelstein, supra note 4; Charo, supra note 4; GUARANTEE WOMEN’S ACCES 
TO PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 4. 
 34. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-304, 20-1-304(4) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West 
2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2010); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 480-5-.03(n) (2001); The 
Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-107-1 (West, 2010).  
 35. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-304, 20-1-304(4) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West 
2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2010) 
 36. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 480-5-.03(n) (2001); The Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience 
Act, MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-107-1 (West, 2010). 
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and not fairness positions alone—is the preferable method to analyze whether 
pharmacist conscience clauses maximize social welfare.   
A.  State Conscience Clause Legislation for Pharmacists 
Proponents of conscience clauses view this legislation as a way to protect a 
pharmacist who faces a moral dilemma when dispensing a drug that may be against 
their personal beliefs.37  Often centered on the birth control and abortion debates, 
supporters argue that pharmacists who are against drugs that fall within the family 
of offensive reproductive services should not be required to dispense them.38  
Indeed, they believe that even the passive distribution of birth control pills or 
emergency contraception (EC) is an integral part of the decision not to have a 
child.39  In the legal scholarship, some argue that the Free Exercise Clause may 
lend support for the protection of pharmacists via conscience clauses.40  In addition, 
proponents of conscience clauses posit that protections under Title VII—which 
prohibits discrimination against employees on the basis of religion—may not afford 
enough protection to pharmacists; therefore, conscience clauses are needed to 
protect the pharmacist’s religious position.41  In sum, the legal scholarship and 
other commentators in support of conscience clause legislation argue that it is fair 
to allow a pharmacist to refuse to fill a prescription that is against the pharmacist’s 
personal beliefs.  
1.  Group 1: Pharmacist Conscience Clauses 
Arkansas, Florida, and South Dakota are in the first group of states with 
pharmacist conscience clause legislation.  In these states, a pharmacist is protected 
from facing liability for refusing to dispense enumerated classes of drugs.   
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, Arkansas enacted a 
conscience clause that allows pharmacists to refuse to fill a prescription for 
contraceptives.42  Specifically, the Arkansas law provides: “Nothing in this 
subchapter shall prohibit a physician, pharmacists, or any other authorized 
                                                                                                     
 37. Herbe, supra note 17, at 78 (suggesting measures should exist to protect “pharmacists from 
having to act contrary to their basic moral convictions”); see generally Courtney Miller, Note, 
Reflections on Protecting Conscience for Health Care Providers: A Call for More Inclusive Statutory 
Protection in Light of Constitutional Considerations, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 327, 342-62 
(2006) (proponent of expansive conscience clause legislation). 
 38. Miller, supra note 37, at 351 (“These individuals have a moral allergy to something in the 
workplace similar to a physical allergy that others might have to a certain substance in the workplace.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 39. Cantor & Baum, supra note 1, at 2009 (“Although some observers argue that active 
participation in an abortion is distinct from passively dispensing emergency contraception, others 
believe that making such a distinction between active and passive participation is meaningless, because 
both forms link the provider to the final outcome in the chain of causation.”). 
 40. Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause: The Quest for 
Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 
789-91 (2007) (raising underlying issues as to why pharmacists may want the protection afforded under 
conscience clause legislation). 
 41. Id. at 791-95 (discussing arguments related to protection under Title VII); see also Miller, supra 
note 37, at 335 (noting that “Title VII does not constitute a very solid line of defense”). 
 42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (West 2010). 
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paramedical personnel from refusing to furnish any contraceptive procedures, 
supplies or information.”43  Although limited to contraceptives, this statute does not 
provide any patient safeguard, such as referral or transfer to another provider. 
In 2003, Florida enacted a statute that applies to pharmacists.  Florida’s statute 
governing family planning provides:  
The provisions of this section shall not be interpreted so as to prevent a physician 
or other person from refusing to furnish any contraceptive or family planning 
service, supplies, or information for medical or religious reasons; and the 
physicians or other person shall not be held liable for such refusal. 44   
Florida’s statute is limited to birth control; however, it does not require a referral to 
another provider. 
South Dakota enacted a pharmacist conscience clause that protects pharmacists 
when refusing to dispense medication for services including abortion, assisted 
suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing.45  While the South Dakota law is specific in 
the types of medications covered under the statute, other states have enacted more 
encompassing laws. 
In sum, in this grouping of conscience clauses, pharmacists are protected if 
they refuse to fill prescriptions for certain types of drugs, mostly birth control.  
These conscience clauses are narrower than the second group of conscience 
clauses.   
2.  Group 2: Pharmacist Conscience Clauses 
Georgia and Mississippi are in the second group of states with pharmacist 
conscience clauses.  In these states, the language of the legislation is broadly 
worded and a pharmacist can avoid liability for refusing to fill a prescription for 
any medication.   
In 2001, Georgia enacted a broad regulation allowing pharmacists to refuse to 
fill a prescription for any medication based on “professional judgment or ethical or 
moral beliefs.”46  Georgia’s regulation is broad in two respects.  First, the 
regulation can be applied to any drug.47  That is, nothing in the regulation limits a 
pharmacist from refusing to fill a prescription for drugs developed through 
controversial biomedical research, such as drugs developed through stem cell 
research.  Second, Georgia’s regulation does not provide the patient with any 
protection, such as a referral or transfer provision.48 
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REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES, http://www.nwlc.org/resource/pharmacy-refusals-state-laws-regulations-
and-policies (last visited Dec. 15, 2010) [hereinafter PHARMACY REFUSALS: STATE LAWS, 
REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES].   
 48. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. R. 480-5-.03(n); see also PHARMACY REFUSALS: STATE LAWS, 
REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES, supra note 47. 
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In 2004, the Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act was signed into 
law.49  This Act protects pharmacists who refuse to participate in any health-related 
service that is against their personal beliefs.50  In addition, the Mississippi Act does 
not require referral to another provider.  
In contrast to the Group 1 legislation, which is limited in scope, the broad 
coverage of the Mississippi Act and Georgia’s regulation could potentially be 
interpreted to cover any area of health care.51  That is, it is possible that a 
pharmacist could refuse to dispense a variety of medications as well as refuse to 
refer a patient elsewhere.  As the therapeutic stem cell research debate is engulfed 
by many of the same arguments seen in the reproductive rights struggle,52 it is 
possible that patients will be refused access to drugs that are developed through 
stem cell research if states continue to pass wide-reaching Group 2 Pharmacist 
Conscience Clause-type legislation. 
B.  Duty-to-Fill—Opposition to Pharmacist Conscience Clauses 
Opponents to conscience clause statutes argue that pharmacists have a 
professional duty of care and their refusal to dispense prescriptions violates this 
duty and adversely affects patients.53  Others feel that these statutes are a covert 
operation by anti-choice groups in an attempt to find yet another way to interfere 
with a woman’s reproductive rights.54  Women’s rights groups argue that a 
pharmacist’s refusal to fill a birth control prescription can have devastating effects 
on women who want to prevent unintended pregnancies and wish to time and space 
their pregnancies.55  In addition, others argue that the pharmacist, acting as a third-
party, has no right to override a physician’s decision to prescribe a drug to a 
patient.56   
Legal scholarship in this area analyzes the application of a myriad of 
arguments related to conscience clauses.  Some argue that pharmacists would fail 
to establish that a common law duty-to-fill all prescriptions would violate the Free 
Exercise Clause.57  Other scholars debate whether conscience clauses violate the 
                                                                                                     
 49. The Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-1 (West 
2010). 
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Establishment Clause.58  Further, it appears undisputed in the literature that a 
pharmacist could not sustain a Title VII claim against an employer that would not 
agree to accommodate an objecting pharmacist.59  The American Bar Association 
(ABA) weighed in against conscience clauses.  The ABA drafted a report 
condemning conscience clause regulations that interfere with any patient’s ability 
to receive information from his or her health care providers in order to make 
informed decisions.60  In sum, the debate in the legal scholarship, medical 
literature, and other groups present fairness arguments—it is not fair to the patients 
for the pharmacist to refuse to fill the prescription. 
In opposition to the pharmacist conscience clause legislation described above, 
several states passed or considered legislation that requires pharmacies or 
pharmacists to fill all valid prescriptions.61  Collectively referred to as “duty-to-fill” 
legislation, they require the pharmacist to fill all prescriptions, absent a medical 
reason not to fill the prescription.  For example, in response to a highly publicized 
refusal by a pharmacist in Chicago to dispense emergency contraception (EC), 
Illinois enacted an emergency rule ordering pharmacists to fill “morning-after pill” 
prescriptions.62  Some states such as New York, Massachusetts, and Colorado have 
enacted or are considering bills that specifically address EC by requiring hospitals 
to provide it to rape victims or to allow certain pharmacists to sell EC without a 
prescription.63  These laws, however, only address EC and not the myriad of other 
drugs that could be covered under expansive conscience clauses. 
At the state level, certain states enacted legislation requiring pharmacies to 
ensure that pharmacists fill legal prescriptions.64  The New Jersey statute, for 
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example, provides:  
A pharmacy practice site has a duty to properly fill lawful prescriptions for 
prescription drugs or devices that it carries for customers, without undue delay, 
despite any conflicts of employees to filling a prescription and dispensing a 
particular prescription drug or device due to sincerely held moral, philosophical or 
religious beliefs.65   
While New Jersey’s statute places the onus on the pharmacy to ensure that valid 
prescriptions are filled, this legislation does not require the pharmacy to carry all 
medications—that is, the pharmacy could choose not to stock contraceptives or 
drugs developed through controversial biomedical research.  Although New 
Jersey’s statute provides safeguards so that a patient will be referred to a pharmacy 
that is reasonably accessible to the patient and transfers the prescription, the 
pharmacy itself is not obligated to carry any particular prescription drug or 
device.66     
At the federal level, Senators Barbara Boxer and Frank R. Lautenberg 
introduced a bill, the Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which requires 
all legal prescriptions are filled.67  This bill provides: “The pharmacy ensures that 
each valid prescription is filled without unnecessary delay or other interference, 
consistent with the normal timeframe for filling prescriptions.”68  A similar bill, 
entitled the “Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act,” was proposed in the House as 
well.69  The House bill ensures that pharmacies fill prescriptions regardless of the 
personal beliefs of a single pharmacist.70  Further, it contains a private cause of 
action.71  The findings to the House bill, however, appear to relate only to the 
struggle between a pharmacist’s religious beliefs and the individual’s right to legal 
contraception.72  Arguably, the House bill is limited because it does not state 
findings beyond contraception, thus potentially limiting its application to 
contraception alone.  Neither of these federal bills is enacted.  
Some opponents to pharmacist conscience clauses are concerned about both 
hypocrisy and expansion.  Some argue that it is hypocritical for pharmacists to fill 
prescriptions for Viagra while not dispensing birth control.73  Others suggest that 
the conscience clauses could be expanded to other controversial areas including 
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mental health,74 HIV,75 antibiotics for sexually transmitted diseases,76 and drugs 
discovered through stem cell research.77  Some analogize the discretion as to 
whether to fill a prescription to the days of segregation.  A letter to the editor in the 
Washington Post stated: “This reminds me of the days of desegregation, when 
some restaurants[’] owners argued that they would not serve blacks because it was 
contrary to their beliefs.  The country decided that they were wrong.”78  
C.  A Middle Ground Proposal 
In this debate, some groups propose a compromise that edits the current 
pharmacist conscience clause legislation to allow pharmacists to refuse to fill 
prescriptions due to personal beliefs, while requiring that an alternative method for 
the patient to receive the prescription be made available.   
While not legally enforceable, the American Pharmacists Association (APhA) 
sets ethical guidelines that many states refer to when crafting and adopting their 
state laws regulating pharmacists.79  The APhA has taken what it considers to be a 
middle ground and provided that a pharmacist should not be required to dispense a 
medication that is against his or her personal beliefs; however, an alternative 
system should be in place to allow the patient to fill the prescription.80  Examples 
of alternative systems could be another pharmacist on duty at the same time that 
can fill the prescription or a referral to another pharmacist that will either be 
working a different shift at that pharmacy or is employed by a different pharmacy.  
Opponents to the APhA’s position cite guidelines in the Code of Ethics that 
conflict with the referral policy.81  The Code articulates that pharmacists place 
“concern for the well-being of the patient at the center of professional practice” and 
that the pharmacist must “respect personal and cultural differences.”82   
Another middle ground approach is offered by Julie Cantor and Ken Baum.  
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They propose a balancing approach similar to the APhA’s approach with respect to 
EC.83  In their proposal, all pharmacies should stock EC and have at least one 
pharmacist on duty at all times willing to dispense the prescription.84  In the 
alternative, if the pharmacy adopts a policy not to stock EC, then a notice should be 
clearly displayed that they do not sell EC and provides information as to where one 
could fill the prescription.85  In addition, objecting pharmacists would be required 
to provide referrals within a reasonable distance to the pharmacy.86  Opponents to 
this plan argue that EC is a time sensitive drug and that having to travel to other 
pharmacies may place a heavy burden on a woman, particularly on women living in 
rural communities.87 
Legal scholarship, medical literature, advocacy groups, and the popular press 
debate the pharmacist conscience clause landscape.  The positions described above 
focus on notions of fairness—either what is fair to the pharmacist, or the patient, or 
a middle ground that is somewhat fair to both sides.  These groups battle using 
fairness-based arguments and the debate is unsatisfactory because each side 
appears vested in value-based assessments.  The current state of the debate appears 
to be at an impasse.  This Article proposes that pharmacist conscience clauses have 
the potential to expand in an era of controversial biomedical research and that 
welfare economics—and not fairness arguments alone—provides the appropriate 
analysis for conscience clause legislation. 
IV.  APPLICATION OF CONSCIENCE CLAUSES TO DISCOVERIES BASED ON STEM CELL 
RESEARCH 
To date, the majority of pharmacists’ personal objections to the requirement to 
dispense all medications are scooped up by the abortion debates.  Indeed, it was the 
“abortion wars” that started the conscience clause movement.88  Pharmacists with 
anti-choice beliefs argue they should not be required to fill prescriptions for birth 
control or EC.  Nuanced within this position is the issue that some pharmacists will 
fill prescriptions for birth control, but not EC because they mistakenly believe EC 
causes an abortion.  Medical research, however, shows that EC is contraception and 
has no effect on established pregnancies.89  Furthermore, some pharmacists do not 
accept the medical definition of pregnancy as beginning with implantation in the 
uterus, believing instead that life begins at fertilization.90  Pharmacists for Life 
International, an Ohio-based group, argue that pharmacists should not have to fill 
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prescriptions that prevent pregnancy.91  The abortion issue continues to be a 
divisive topic in political campaigns, judicial appointments, press reports, and 
numerous other areas of daily life.92  Opponents to abortion support their beliefs by 
attacking on multiple fronts,93 including biomedical research such as stem cell 
research.94 
Many arguments against stem cell research grow out of the abortion debates.  
What follows is an explanation of stem cell research and the surrounding debate.  
Similar to the misperceptions surrounding EC, many of the ethical and value-based 
objections to embryonic stem cell research are based on misinformation and fall 
away with a clear understanding of the science involved.  Those who oppose 
contraception on religious grounds will most likely oppose embryonic stem cell 
research because the starting material for some stem cell research is embryos 
discarded from fertility clinics.  The Catholic Church, for example, explicitly and 
openly opposes embryonic stem cell research.95 
In 2001, the Bush Administration placed a practical ban on the use of federal 
funds to support stem cell research, which was recently revoked by the Obama 
Administration.96  While this ban was in effect, states and private entities pushed 
forward with stem cell research with the expectation that continued research can 
provide insights into new treatments and drugs.  If stem cell research is successful, 
patients could face obstacles when attempting to fill prescriptions for drugs 
developed through this research.  For pharmacists who are protected by broad 
conscience clauses, it would only be a small step to expand their objections to 
therapies based on stem cell research.  Furthering this stance by pharmacists, 
groups that promote the use of conscience clauses may then disseminate 
information to pharmacists so that the pharmacists are aware of which drugs are 
developed through stem cell research.97  
A.  A Description of Stem Cell Research 
An understanding of stem cell research is critical to any scientific, legal or 
ethical discussion.  Researchers became interested in embryonic stem cells because 
stem cells have properties that make them good candidates to treat multiple 
diseases.  Stem cells can be maintained in an undifferentiated state and then 
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induced to form a specific cell lineage.98  Scientists hypothesize that this 
characteristic will allow them to turn stem cells into various tissues in order to 
replace diseased neurons, muscles or organs in a sick person.  Illnesses that could 
be benefited by this type of treatment include Parkinson’s Disease, heart disease, 
diabetes, Alzheimer’s Disease, and others.99  Other promising areas of research that 
could be expanded with embryonic stem cell research include understanding 
various genetic diseases and generating diseased cells for drug screening.100   
Scientists work with two different types of human stem cells, either adult or 
embryonic.  Adult stem cells may not be ideal starting materials because they have 
limitations which may prohibit the ability to induce them to form the wide variety 
of cell types that embryonic stem cells can.  Most of the controversy surrounding 
stem cell research concerns the process of obtaining embryonic stem cells. 
Embryonic stem cell lines are usually obtained through an in vitro, i.e. test 
tube, fertilization procedure.101  The egg is fertilized in vitro and it is allowed to 
grow in a Petri dish for approximately three-to-four days to form a blastocyst that 
contains three concentric circles of cells.102  Stem cells are isolated from the inner-
most circle and then grown in a tissue culture on a plastic dish coated with feeder 
cells that provide a sticky surface, nutrients, and growth factors.103  Once the stem 
cells are established, they can be grown and used in experiments or frozen and sent 
to other laboratories for experiments.104 
Another way to create stem cells is to use a technique called somatic cell 
nuclear transfer (SCNT).105  This technique allows a scientist to create a diseased 
stem cell line by transferring the nucleus of a patient’s cell into an enucleated 
egg.106  The egg is then stimulated to divide in vitro and form a blastocyst.107  As 
described above, cells from the inner cell mass are extracted after a few days 
growth and then induced to form the diseased tissue.  This technique is far from 
being perfected and controversy surrounded a South Korean scientist who falsified 
data in an article in the journal Science stating that his lab could create diseased 
cells using SCNT.108  While the promise of studying diseased tissues through stem 
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cells created by SCNT is exciting, it appears that the scientific community will be 
confronted by many obstacles in mastering this technology.109  The SCNT 
technique, in particular, can be used for drug screening. 
A national debate, focused on whether life begins in a Petri dish, surrounds the 
stem cell research debate.  Proponents of stem cell research argue that life does not 
begin in a Petri dish.  Moreover, they argue, most of the starting material comes 
from fertilized eggs destined to be discarded at fertility clinics.110  Proponents 
believe that it is more useful to use the discarded eggs for research than to throw 
them in the garbage.  Opponents argue that it is morally and ethically wrong to 
create a “life” with the purpose of destroying it by isolating the inner cell mass.111  
The arguments about when life begins echo the abortion debates and it is 
reasonable to believe that opponents to stem cell research would employ 
conscience clauses and refuse to fill prescriptions for drugs developed through stem 
cell research.112 
B.  Federal and State Policy Governing Stem Cell Research 
In 2001, President Bush declared by executive order that the federal 
government would not fund stem cell research for any new embryonic stem cell 
lines.113  Following the President’s announcement, the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) announced that they would not fund research for embryonic stem cell lines 
created after 9:00 EDT August 9, 2001.114  This created a practical ban for federal 
funds on embryonic stem cell research because only a limited number of stem cell 
lines had been created prior to August 9, 2001, and these cells lines had not yet 
been characterized, making it unclear whether they could be used in any 
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pharmacists regarding drugs developed through stem cell research.  See, e.g., Pharmacists for Life 
International, supra note 19. 
 113. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Stem Cell Research, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 
9, 2001, 8:01 PM CDT), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/08/ 
20010809-2.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Discussion of President Bush]. 
 114. The Nat’l Inst. Of Health, NIH’s Role in Federal Policy: Stem Cell Research, 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/NIHFedPolicy.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).   
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research.115 
Congress considered stem cell legislation.  The House passed a bill that 
prohibits both therapeutic and reproductive cloning and includes a criminal 
penalty.116  Senators, on the other hand, introduced a bill that would allow 
therapeutic cloning, but ban reproductive cloning.117  In 2007, the Stem Cell 
Research Enhancement Act of 2007 was passed in both the House and the Senate—
President Bush, however, vetoed the legislation.118  Recently in 2009, the Stem Cell 
Research Enhancement Act of 2009 was introduced in both the House and the 
Senate. 119  These bills are in committee at the time of this writing.120  To date, 
Congress does not have a federal policy in effect.   
In response to the practical ban on stem cell research at the federal level, 
several states passed initiatives allowing stem cell research, although many of these 
initiatives were under-funded.121  In 2004, however, Californians passed a $3 
billion referendum creating a hospitable home for stem cell researchers.122  Much 
of the controversy surrounding California’s initiative centered on the ethical 
debates described above.123  Interestingly, however, the California referendum 
faced opposition within the scientific community because some believe that state-
by-state funding is not an adequate substitute for federal policies and funding.124  
Thus, some hoped the federal government would change its policy.125  Since 
California passed its stem cell research initiative, other states, such as New Jersey 
and Massachusetts, proposed investing millions of dollars in their states’ stem cell 
research.126    
Both individual states and private institutions fund and conduct stem cell 
research.  For example, Harvard University opened the Harvard Stem Cell Institute, 
where they conduct research that is partially funded by the Howard Hughes 
                                                                                                     
 115. Federal Funding for Stem Cell Research: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 108th Cong. 20-21 (2003) (statement of Dr. Ronald McKay, Senior Investigator, Nat’l 
Inst. of Nemological Disorders and Stroke); see also Sax, supra note 98, at 15-19 (see references therein 
to the scientific debate regarding the stem cell policy). 
 116. Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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(2003). 
 118. Stem Cell Research Enactment Act of 2007, S. 5, 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
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 119. Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 873, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-873 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Stem Cell 
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 120. H.R. 873, § 487. 
 121. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:27 (2004). 
 122. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125300 (West 2004).  See also Ceci Connolly, Calif. Stem Cell 
Initiative Could Backfire Nationally, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2004, at A15.  
 123. Connolly, supra note 122, at A15. 
 124. Bruck, supra note 94, at 64-70. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Jonathan Finer, Mass. Senate Passes Stem Cell Bill That May Face Governor’s Veto, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 31, 2005, at A2; Laura Mansnerus, New Jersey Forges Ahead on Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 21, 2004, at B1.  
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Medical Institute.127  In addition, the private sector, including pharmaceutical 
companies, can conduct stem cell research.  The potential exists, however, for 
ethically questionable practices, and federal guidelines would preemptively protect 
subjects, researchers, and patients.128 
On March 9, 2009, President Obama issued a statement ordering that the 
limitations on embryonic stem cell research by the Bush Administration be 
lifted.129  In July 2009, the NIH released the guidelines for stem cell research.130  
Despite certain constraints on stem cell research in the federal guidelines, it is clear 
that certain types of embryonic stem cell research will be federally funded, thus 
allowing this area of research to move forward at a faster clip.  The influx of 
federal funding will allow scientists all over the country to conduct stem cell 
research and hopefully lead to the development of stem cell-based therapies for a 
variety of diseases.  It is highly unlikely that the opponents of embryonic stem cell 
research will accept defeat.  Rather, opponents to stem cell research will most 
likely continue to attempt to restrict access to therapies developed through stem cell 
research.  Broadly worded pharmacist conscience clauses—already enacted in two 
states—provide an attractive avenue for opponents to stem cell research to restrict 
patient access to beneficial therapies.      
C.  The Controversy Surrounding Plan B as a Backdrop for Debate Regarding 
Drugs Developed Through Stem Cell Research 
The controversy surrounding Plan B provides a good background for 
understanding the interaction between the stem cell research debate and the 
arguments related to the potential expansion of pharmacist conscience clauses.  
Plan B, also known as the morning-after pill or EC, must be taken within a limited 
time frame after unprotected sex in order to prevent pregnancy.  Plan B has no 
effect on an established pregnancy.131  Originally a prescription drug, a woman was 
required to contact a physician after an episode of unprotected sex or contraceptive 
failure, receive a prescription, travel to a pharmacy, fill the prescription (assuming 
the pharmacist would fill it), and take the medication.132  The risk of pregnancy 
increases the longer it takes for a woman to begin Plan B.133   
In 2004, the scientific advisors at the FDA overwhelmingly recommended 
switching Plan B from a prescription drug to OTC, but in an unprecedented 
                                                                                                     
 127. Alvin Powell, From the Laboratory to the Patient, HARV. UNIV. GAZETTE (Apr. 22, 2004), 
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/04.22/99-StemOver.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).  See 
also Claudia Dreifus, At Harvard’s Stem Cell Center, the Barriers Run Wide and Deep, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 24, 2006, at F2 (noting that Howard Hughes Medical Institute is providing private funding for 
embryonic stem cell research at Harvard); Howard Hughes Medical Institute, New Human Embryonic 
Stem-cell Lines to be Made Available to Researchers (March 3, 2004), 
http://www.hhmi.org/news/melton4.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). 
 128. See generally, Sax, supra note 98, at 33-35 (promoting uniform guidelines). 
 129. Exec. Order No. 13505, supra note 9. 
 130. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH GUIDELINES ON HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH, supra note 10. 
 131. Cantor & Baum, supra note 1, at 2009. 
 132. Alastair J.J. Wood, et al., A Sad Day for Science at the FDA, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1197 
(Sept. 22, 2005). 
 133. Id. (“The risk of pregnancy increases from 0.4 percent if contraception is initiated within 24 
hours to 2.7 percent if it is initiated 48 to 72 hours after intercourse.”). 
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decision, the agency rejected the advice of the scientific advisors.134  This led to an 
enormous battle at the FDA with intense ethical debates and ultimately 
resignations, including the assistant commissioner for women’s health and director 
of the Office of Women’s Health at the FDA, Susan Wood.135  Shortly after the 
decision not to move Plan B to OTC status, the commissioner of the FDA, Dr. 
Lester Crawford, also resigned.136 
The advisory committee at the FDA recommended, in a vote of 23-4, to switch 
EC to OTC based on both safety and the importance of receiving the medication in 
a limited time frame.137  In addition, studies showed that teenagers understood how 
to use Plan B and that its availability had no effect on their behavior.138  The FDA 
responded with concerns that young teens may not comprehend the proper use of 
EC.139  Some suggest that this reaction is just another example in a long line of 
Bush Administration tactics to oppose any line of defense that lessens risk 
associated with sex.140  Indeed, the FDA delayed the decision stating that it was 
unsure how to restrict access to older age groups because it did not want to 
negatively influence the sexual behavior of teens.141  Ultimately, in 2006, Plan B 
was approved for OTC, but only for women eighteen years of age and older.142  In 
2009, the age limit was lowered to women seventeen years of age and older.143  In 
some states, a patient over the age of 17 does not need a prescription for Plan B 
from a doctor, but a pharmacist must dispense the drug to the patient.144 
The arguments surrounding Plan B are an extension of the abortion debates 
                                                                                                     
 134. Specter, supra note 108, at 60 (“The agency had never rejected a similar request against the 
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 141. Couzin, supra note 138. 
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2009), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm149568.htm (last visited 
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 144. See FDA, FDA Approves Over-the-Counter Access for Plan B for Women 18 and Over, 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108717.htm. (“Plan B will 
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and “appears to reflect political meddling in the drug-approval process.”145  These 
types of arguments are finding their way into all aspects of drug-related 
reproductive rights.  As described in Part III, the pharmacist conscience clauses 
allow personal beliefs to hinder access to prescription drugs.  A similar debate 
arose in the FDA process over Plan B.  These viewpoints are also weighing in over 
stem cell research.  Value-based debates appear to enter all fronts of medicine, 
science, and technology.      
D.  Religious Beliefs as Applied to Stem Cell Research 
The religious opposition to abortion appears connected to the Bush 
Administration’s policy regarding stem cell research.  In 2001, President Bush 
released a statement in opposition to federal funding to support the creation of new 
embryonic stem cell lines based on his personal “belief in the fundamental value 
and sanctity of human life.” 146  He also noted that his position on stem cell 
research is “shaped by deeply held beliefs.”147  Moreover, opponents to stem cell 
research argue that the fertilized embryo used for starting material has the 
“potential” for life and should not be purposefully destroyed.148  Interestingly, 
Karen Brauer, President of Pharmacists for Life International used the phrase 
“purposeful destruction” in an editorial in favor of conscience clauses.149  The 
statements used in support of conscience clause legislation mimic the statements 
used to oppose stem cell research.  
The Catholic Church opposes embryonic stem cell research.  In the publication 
Regarding the Instruction Dignitas Personae, the Catholic Church classifies 
embryonic stem cell research as “gravely illicit.”150  In a conclusory manner, this 
publication provides that “adult stem cells give more positive results than 
embryonic stem cells.”151  This statement cannot be supported in light of the 
obstacles—such as lack of funding—to conducting embryonic stem cell research.  
The federal government recently lifted the practical ban on the federal funding of 
stem cell research.  As mentioned above, it is impossible to know at this time 
whether adult stem cells may give better—or even different—results than 
embryonic stem cells.    
The next logical step for supporters of conscience clause legislation would be 
to expand the reach of such legislation to medications derived from stem cell 
research.152  Indeed, a state senator in Washington State already introduced an 
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amendment to this effect.153  Even if opponents to stem cell research lose the battle 
to private and public funding initiatives, the war can continue at subsequent levels.  
Once the FDA approves a drug developed through stem cell research, pharmacists 
in states with broad conscience clauses, such as Mississippi and Georgia, could 
invoke their personal beliefs and refuse to fill a prescription because they believe 
life was destroyed to create the therapy.154 
The current scientific atmosphere is charged with energy for discovering new 
therapies and drugs based on stem cell research.  Numerous areas are open to 
debate, including compensation for donors and the 2009 federal guidelines.155  This 
Article argues that, among the many policy avenues that need to be addressed 
regarding stem cell research, one important area concerns patients’ rights.   
Because of the value-based nature of their arguments, proponents and 
opponents of stem cell research are at an impasse.  In Part V, this Article argues 
that we should move away from a solely value-based dialogue and approach this 
discussion from a different perspective—that of normative economics. 
V.  THE APPLICATION OF WELFARE ECONOMICS TO PHARMACIST CONSCIENCE 
CLAUSE LEGISLATION 
A wide breadth of literature applies economic analyses to provide guidance, 
support, or disagree with policy decisions.  Law and economic scholarship focuses, 
in part, on whether various forms of economic rationale can provide guidance for 
law-makers.  The phrase “law and economics” covers a large area of scholarship, 
some of which is applicable to conscience clauses.  Recent scholarship by Louis 
Kaplow and Steven Shavell applies welfare economics—which focuses on 
individuals’ well-being—to various areas of the law.156  In their work, Kaplow and 
Shavell argue that the application of welfare economics provides superior results 
based on efficiency rather than using the traditional notions of fairness.157 
As highlighted in Part III, the discussion regarding pharmacist conscience 
clauses weighs the religious beliefs of the objecting pharmacist against the ability 
of the patient to receive their valid prescription drug—that is, the discussion is 
focused on notions of fairness to each side.  The debate appears to be at an impasse.  
Legal scholarship debating conscience clauses also focuses on notions of 
fairness158—including, but not limited to, first amendment jurisprudence, Title VII, 
women’s rights, feminist legal theory, right to privacy, use of various litigation 
tactics, etc.159  Applying these notions of fairness, legal scholars and advocacy 
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groups propose a range of solutions, which run the gamut from absolute protection 
of objecting pharmacists from liability to alternative systems of seamless delivery 
to a statutory duty to fill all valid prescriptions.  Kaplow and Shavell, in promoting 
the application of welfare economics, argue that advancing notions of fairness for 
policy determinations can actually reduce individuals’ well-being; whereas welfare 
economics, by definition, is concerned with the aggregate well-being of 
individuals.160     
This Article suggests that the courts or policymakers should apply an 
economic rationale to analyze pharmacist conscience clauses.  Proponents of 
conscience clause legislation argue about whether it is fair for a pharmacist to have 
to fill prescriptions that may conflict with his or her personal or religious beliefs.  
Opponents argue that, for various reasons, it isn’t fair if patients cannot receive 
their prescriptions.  These arguments, however, fail to address or create a model 
that best serves society as a whole—that is, the arguments do not address the 
maximization of aggregate social utility.   
A.  Pharmacist Conscience Clauses Are Part of Tort Law 
Legal scholarship in this area applies fairness and value-based arguments to 
support or oppose conscience clauses, but what the scholarship does not adequately 
address is that conscience clauses are part of tort law.  Pharmacists can be held 
liable for professional negligence,161 and courts from around the country recognize 
pharmacists as having a duty of care towards patients.162   
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2010] ACCESS TO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 113 
Absent a conscience clause, pharmacists are liable for refusing to fill a 
prescription for a non-gatekeeper reason.  At issue in Noesen v. State of Wisconsin 
Department of Regulation and Licensing, Pharmacy Examining Board,163 for 
example, was whether the pharmacist, Noesen, violated the standard of care when 
he refused to fill or transfer a prescription.164  In Noesen, patient Renz took her 
birth control prescription to K-Mart, where Noesen was the on-duty pharmacist.165  
Noesen questioned Renz as to whether she needed the prescription for 
“contraceptive purposes.”166  When Renz replied in the affirmative, Noesen advised 
her of his objection and refused to fill the prescription.167  Ranz took her empty 
prescription package to Wal-Mart and the pharmacist at Wal-Mart called Noesen to 
transfer the prescription; Noesen refused.168  Ranz successfully filled her 
prescription two days later—but only after missing her first dose.169  Renz filed a 
complaint and administrative proceedings were instituted against Noesen.170  The 
appellate court affirmed the Board’s conclusion that “Noesen violated the standard 
of care applicable to pharmacists when he refused to fill or transfer a patient’s 
prescription for an oral contraceptive.”171      
Conscience clauses, in providing blanket protection from liability, 
acknowledge that pharmacists would otherwise be subject to liability.  Arkansas’s 
statute, for example, provides: “No such institution, employee, agent, or physician 
shall be held liable for the refusal.”172  Likewise, Florida’s statute provides: “The 
provisions of this section shall not be interpreted so as to prevent a physician or 
other person from refusing to furnish any contraceptive or family planning service, 
supplies, or information for medical or religious reasons; and the physician or other 
person shall not be held liable for such refusal.”173  As described in detail below, 
the conscience clauses effectively create a no-liability regime.   
B.  Application of Welfare Economics to the Basic Theory of Liability and 
Deterrence in a Unilateral Tort Model 
Kaplow and Shavell’s scholarship defines how welfare economics applies to 
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tort law.174  The application of welfare economics to evaluate social policy involves 
two steps: (1) apply a positive analysis to determine the effects of the policy; and 
(2) engage in a normative analysis to determine the policy’s social desirability.175  
“The hallmark of welfare economics is that policies are assessed exclusively in 
terms of their effects on the well-being of individuals.”176  In promoting the 
application of welfare economics over the use of fairness, Kaplow and Shavell 
explain: 
[A]ny notion of fairness would be subject to our criticism: employing welfare 
economics always entails choosing the rule under which everyone is better off than 
under each of the alternatives; hence, any deviation from the attempt to enhance 
individual’s well-being—in whatever setting—entails the result that everyone 
must be worse off.  This conclusion is true whether the notion of fairness rests on a 
need for compensation, a demand for punishment, a desire to realize corrective 
justice, or any other basis.  Moreover, this conclusion is true for any mixed view, 
under which weight is given both to a notion of fairness and to individuals’ well-
being; as long as any weight is a notion of fairness, one will sometimes be led to 
choose a different legal rule from that under welfare economics, and in every such 
instance, all individuals will be made worse off.177   
Thus, welfare economics analyzes the net maximization of social well-being. 
In his recent scholarship, Shavell describes the application of welfare 
economics to tort law in a unilateral accident model.  Shavell’s analysis describes 
how to minimize the sum of the costs of care and of expected accident losses, 
which equal the total social costs.178  A unilateral accident occurs when only the 
injurer’s exercise of care affects the accident risk.179  A close approximation of this 
is where an automobile hits a pedestrian; it is unilateral because the pedestrian’s 
actions are minor and have almost no effect on reducing risk.180  In this type of 
situation, the optimal social welfare occurs where the level of care minimizes the 
total social costs.181  The three scenarios under which to discuss the optimal social 
welfare in a unilateral accident model are: (1) no-liability; (2) negligence; and (3) 
strict liability.  A theoretical analysis of the social costs under these three regimes 
demonstrates how each scenario affects social welfare.   
First, Shavell provides an analysis of the level of due care of the injurer, e.g., 
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the driver of the automobile, in the unilateral model.182  Under a no liability regime, 
injurers will not exercise any level of care because, although there are costs, there 
is no benefit to the injurer to exercise care.183  At the other end of the spectrum, 
under a strict liability regime, injurers must pay for all accident losses that they 
cause.184  Here, the injurers will exercise the level of care that is identical to the 
social goal of minimizing total social costs.185  Under a negligence regime, the 
injurer will be liable only for accident losses caused by the injurer where the injurer 
failed to exercise a level of due care as defined by the courts.186  Thus, the injurer 
would not take care above the level of due care as defined by the courts or a statute 
because there is no advantage for the injurer to do so.187   
Second, Shavell provides an analysis of the level of activity of the injurer in a 
unilateral tort model.188  Under a no liability regime, the injurer engages in the 
amount of activity that gives them the greatest utility without consideration of the 
social costs.189  In a strict liability regime, the injurer will choose the optimal level 
of activity because he or she will enjoy the benefits of the activity, but still has to 
pay the social costs.190  Under a negligence regime, injurers “will engage in their 
activity whenever the utility they derive net of the cost of care is positive.”191  For 
social welfare to be maximized, an injurer must choose a level of due care and 
select a level of activity that “appropriately balances the utility he obtains against 
the additional risks he creates and the costs of care.”192  The law will establish the 
standard of care so that the injurer can calculate and appropriately balance his or 
her behavior.   
Although it appears from the above analysis that strict liability will always 
lead to the maximum social welfare in a unilateral situation, this is not always the 
case.  The defect of the negligence rule, which can lead to excessive activity levels, 
must depend on the magnitude of the losses caused by the activity.193  That is, if an 
activity is extremely hazardous—such as blasting—then strict liability is 
appropriate because of the high risk of harm despite the use of all reasonable 
care.194  If, however, the activity creates a low risk of accident losses when 
reasonable care is taken, then the importance of excessive activity under a 
negligence rule will be minimal.195      
                                                                                                     
 182. Id. at 178-82. 
 183. Id. at 179. 
 184. Id. at 179-80. 
 185. Id. at 179-80. 
 186. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 180. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 193-99 
 189. Id. at 195. 
 190. Id. at 196. 
 191. Id. 
 192. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 194. 
 193. Id. at 197. 
 194. Id. at 197-98; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 (2010) (defining the application of strict liability).  
 195. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 197-98. 
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C.  Pharmacist Conscience Clauses—An Economic Approach 
Described below is an argument that pharmacist conscience clauses can be 
analyzed under a unilateral tort model.196  To analogize pharmacist conscience 
clauses to Shavell’s unilateral tort model: The injurers are the refusing pharmacists 
and the victims are the patients who are not able to receive their prescription from 
the pharmacist.  The refusing pharmacist is the injurer because when an individual 
decides to become a pharmacist they know an integral part of that job is to fill valid 
prescriptions.197  If a person does not want to fill prescriptions, then they never 
have to become a pharmacist.198  The harm only flows from the refusing pharmacist 
to the patient when the pharmacist refuses to fill a prescription.   
Here, the injurers (i.e., refusing pharmacists) and victims (i.e., patients) are 
distinct groups and the well-being of each group may be different.199  These two 
groups will have different preferences—the pharmacists may prefer a rule of no 
liability,200 whereas the victims may prefer a rule of strict liability.201  The 
economic goal is to maximize social utility.  Under this model, what is gained by 
the patients is lost by the pharmacists who would choose the liability protection for 
refusing to fill prescriptions.202  
                                                                                                     
 196. This Article descriptively applies welfare economics to pharmacist conscience clauses in a 
unilateral tort model to demonstrate how welfare economics can be applied to the debate.  The Author 
acknowledges that other models may be utilized to analyze pharmacist conscience clauses through the 
use of welfare economics.  The purpose here, however, is to demonstrate that an economic approach—
as opposed to fairness arguments—offers an attractive alternative to the current debate. 
 197. See Cicconi, supra note 57, at 723.  Cf. Harrington, supra note 40, at 804-09 (discussing 
whether there is a duty of the pharmacist to dispense medication).   
 198. This Article does not fully consider whether this may raise an autonomy issue.  Instead, this 
Article views the decision not to become a pharmacist as equal to reasons why many people do not enter 
certain professions.  For example, some groups are opposed to blood transfusions; thus, one may suspect 
that people in these groups do not become surgeons.  The main point is that individuals know, ex ante, 
requirements for certain professions.  If an individual does not or cannot satisfy the basic requirements 
of a profession, then that individual knows that they should consider a different profession. 
 199. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 118. 
 200. Indeed, not all pharmacists will prefer this as many pharmacists may be against conscience 
clause legislation.  Another point where there is room for debate, is whether a pharmacist’s preference to 
refuse to fill prescriptions could be considered an objectively bad preference and therefore the 
preference will have no value in an economic calculation.  For example, in NEW FOUNDATIONS OF 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, Matthew Alder and Eric Posner provide an example of an objectively bad 
preference (here, a preference that “homosexuals not be helped through AIDS research”) that would 
most likely not be considered by an agency applying a cost-benefit analysis.  MATTHEW ALDER & ERIC 
POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 129-30 (2006).  Similarly, under conscience 
clause legislation, a pharmacist may escape liability for refusing to fill a prescription for HIV 
medications because the pharmacist is personally opposed to helping homosexuals.  Thus, a debate 
about determining a value to assign to the objecting pharmacist’s preferences should consider the above 
when applying a normative economic approach to conscience clause legislation.  See id. at 139 (“We 
could imagine, for example, guidelines holding that preferences that are based on animus against racial 
minorities, women, and homosexuals would not be counted.”). 
 201. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 118. 
 202. Again, an argument could be that the objecting pharmacist’s preference should not be 
considered or given a low value.  For example, if the analysis determines that a preference against, for 
example, people who oppose medication for persons infected with HIV is due to opposition to 
homosexuality and is considered an objectively bad preference, then this preference may be assigned a 
value of $0.  Or, perhaps, if a preference is not considered objectively bad, then the analysis could focus 
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Pharmacist conscience clauses operate to shield a refusing pharmacist from 
any and all liability should the pharmacist refuse to fill a prescription due to a 
personal or religious belief.  These clauses can be descriptively analogized to the 
no care standard described above in the unilateral driving model.  Under the 
pharmacist conscience clause regime, a refusing pharmacist will not exercise any 
level of care because there is no benefit to the injurer in doing so, even though 
there would be costs to the patient.  Further, under the pharmacist conscience 
clause regime, a refusing pharmacist will engage in the amount of activity that 
gives them the greatest utility without any consideration of the social costs, such as 
failure to give a patient a time-sensitive prescription.  “[A] regime of no liability, 
one that does not satisfy the notions of fairness that we consider, will be best for all 
individuals when liability does not influence precautions and is costly to 
administer.”203  Here, pharmacist conscience clauses are not best for individuals’ 
well-being because liability does influence precautions.  Under the no liability 
regime of a pharmacist conscience clause, the refusing pharmacist will not take any 
precautions to fill prescriptions that are against their religious beliefs, regardless of 
the cost to the patients, harm will occur, and the patients will bear the costs.204    
Upon the theoretical demonstration that pharmacist conscience clauses can be 
analogized to a no-care regime, and may not maximize the well-being of 
individuals, the question becomes whether pharmacists should be held liable under 
negligence or strict liability for refusing to fill a valid prescription.205 
Strict liability is most likely not the appropriate measure for the injurer’s 
liability with respect to pharmacist conscience clauses because this is not a 
situation where substantial risk is created despite the exercise of due care.206  Strict 
liability is traditionally reserved for those activities—such as blasting—that cannot 
be made safe with any reasonable exercise of due care and the activity can be 
classified as one not of common usage.207  An appropriate level of due care—i.e., 
liability for refusing to fill a valid prescription based on the pharmacist’s religious 
beliefs—can be assigned to support a negligence regime.  That is, a court can 
establish a standard of due care that considers the gatekeeper functions of the 
                                                                                                     
on the costs associated with the affected person in obtaining the medication versus delaying or 
prohibiting obtaining the medication.  See ALDER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 140 (describing how to 
handle objectively bad preferences in cost-benefit analysis).  In their book, Adler and Posner 
acknowledge the potential problems with monetizing the costs and benefits of regulations given parties’ 
preferences.  Id. at 149.  
 203. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 105 (footnote omitted). 
 204. Cf. id. at 102 (discussing a regime of no liability in a reciprocal accident paradigm).  
 205. The Author acknowledges that a stylistic model was applied for this determination.  That is, that 
the failure of the patient to receive the medication is the main variable used to analyze the individual’s 
well-being.  This restrictive assumption, however, allows for a simple model and is helpful to illustrate 
the problems associated with conscience clauses.  See id. at 32 n.33.  Further, this Article does not 
consider the distributional effect of moving money from the injurer to the victim as a variable that 
should influence the analysis.  See FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 
654-55 (explaining why “legal rules should generally not be chosen on the basis of their distributional 
effects”).  This model assumes that the cost of precaution is lower than the cost associated with inducing 
the injurer to take care.  See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 102-03. 
 206. See, e.g., FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 202. 
 207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 
(2010) (defining elements of abnormally dangerous activity).  
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pharmacist.  Pharmacists can exercise the due care to meet the professional 
standards of their gatekeeper medical functions.  
The negligence rule for pharmacists may be favored under welfare economics 
because a level of due care can be established that maximizes social welfare.  The 
professional standard of care can be established by reference to a national standard 
or the state licensing provisions.   
If the level of care is established by statute or regulation, state licensing boards 
can utilize an economic analysis to establish the standard of care that will be 
applied by the courts.  Factors to be considered in the analysis to establish the 
professional standard of care in order to minimize social costs include: the 
likelihood of harm, the probable extent of harm, the number of individuals at risk, 
and the ease in which those causing injury can alleviate risk.208  That is, the state 
licensing board can consider the above analysis and factors when establishing the 
requirements of professional conduct.  This is important because some state 
licensing provisions are vague and may not effectively guide a court.  For example, 
the statute governing pharmacists in Kansas provides: “Nothing in this section shall 
be construed as preventing a pharmacist from refusing to fill or refill any 
prescription if in the pharmacist’s professional judgment and discretion such 
pharmacist is of the opinion that it should not be filled or refilled.”209  Under the 
Kansas provision, a court would likely have a difficult time discerning the standard 
of care for determining when it is reasonable for a pharmacist to refuse to fill a 
prescription.  The statute is not clear as to what is encompassed within 
“professional judgment and discretion.”  Pharmacists, as professionals, are trained 
in pharmacology.  As long as the drug does not pose any pharmacological risk to 
the health and safety of the patient, then should anything other than professional 
judgment be considered?  State policymakers can apply welfare economics to 
define professional conduct in such a way that a court can apply the specific 
standard of care to a pharmacist who is facing a claim of professional negligence.  
Alternatively, it may be that state licensing boards prefer to have matters regarding 
professional conduct adjudicated in administrative proceedings, with review by 
appellate courts.210  In either case, the state licensing board can apply welfare 
economics to define professional and unprofessional conduct.211 
Another dimension to consider is whether the victims could or should exercise 
any level of care.  If a patient receives a prescription from their physician and 
travels to a pharmacy to fill it, it does not seem as though the victim can adjust their 
behavior to avoid accident losses.  Here, the pharmacists and pharmacies are in the 
                                                                                                     
 208. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 191 (discussing 
determination of due care). 
 209. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1637 (2009). 
 210. See, e.g., Noesen, 751 N.W.2d 385; cf. ALDER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 2 (“To simplify 
greatly, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) requires the regulatory agency to sum up the costs and benefits of a 
proposed regulation, and issue the regulation if the benefits exceed the costs.”). 
 211. It is unclear whether it is more cost effective to have the courts perform analyses based on the 
facts in front of them or to have each state conduct a cost benefit analysis when determining the state 
licensing regulations.  A full scale cost-benefit analysis may be too expensive for a state to consider 
because at some point it becomes so expensive there are diminishing returns.  ALDER & POSNER, supra 
note 200, at 109. 
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best—if not the only—position to avoid the losses.212  The injurers are the only 
party that can take the precaution to fill all valid and legal prescriptions in order to 
minimize total social costs.213   
Under the above analysis, the application of welfare economics demonstrates 
that negligence is the appropriate regime.  Another advantage to the application of 
welfare economics to analyze conscience clause legislation is transparency in 
decision-making.214  Liability for refusal to fill valid prescriptions allows the 
pharmacists to know, ex ante, the consequences of not serving as a gatekeeper and 
refusing to fill the prescription due to religious or personal beliefs.215 
The theoretical model outlined above demonstrates that pharmacist conscience 
clauses create a no-liability regime that fails to maximize individuals’ well-
being.216  An empirical model could be created to predict the economic costs 
resulting from conscience clause legislation.  Rural communities, for example, may 
have high costs associated with a pharmacist’s refusal to fill a prescription.  Low 
income persons in rural communities may not have access to transportation or the 
ability to take time away from work to travel to neighboring communities to fill 
prescriptions.217  Notably, it is states such as South Dakota and Mississippi—with 
higher percentages of low income and rural communities—that have conscience 
clause legislation.218  The 2000 Census data shows that both South Dakota and 
Mississippi are largely rural states.219  A recent government survey looking at state-
by-state poverty levels calculates that 13.9% of citizens in South Dakota are under 
the poverty level and 19.9% of citizens in Mississippi are below the poverty 
level.220  Citizens in these states will potentially face a higher degree of difficulty 
when attempting to fill prescriptions initially refused by their local pharmacist.   
By assigning values in the economic calculus, and employing the economic 
tests of Pareto improvement or Kalder-Hicks, conscience clause legislation can be 
evaluated to determine if it maximizes individuals’ well-being as compared to an 
absence of such legislation.  A potential Pareto improvement can be obtained 
                                                                                                     
 212. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 189. 
 213. Id.  Social costs are defined as the sum of the costs of care and of expected accident losses.  Id. 
at 177-99. 
 214. See, e.g., ALDER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 135 (“CBA enhances transparency by forcing 
agencies to use a common metric for justifying their decisions.”).  
 215. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 156, at 49 (“[N]otions of fairness often ignore important 
aspects of ex ante behavior.”). 
 216. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 178, at 663; see also MISHAN, 
supra note 175, at 412-13 (maintaining that cost-benefit analysis is a useful technique for determinations 
of social policy, although it has certain limitations). 
 217. Tomkowiak, supra note 8, at 1349-50. 
 218. Teliska, supra note 32, at 241 (looking at the legislative trend in pharmacist refusal clauses in 
South Dakota). 
 219. Id. at 244-46 (discussing the results of the 2000 Census); see also U.S. Census Bureau, State 
and County Quick Facts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/28000.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) 
(for census information). 
 220. U.S. Census Bureau, Percent of People Below Poverty Level in the Past 12 Months (For Whom 
Poverty Status is Determined): 2008, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/Thematic 
MapFramesetServlet?_ bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-tm_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_M00601&-ds_ 
name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_&-_MapEvent=displayBy&-_dBy=040&-_lang=en&-_sse=on (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2010).  
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where the “gains can be so distributed as to make everyone in the community better 
off.”221  Some law and economics scholars refer to the potential Pareto 
improvement as the Kalder-Hicks test, which relaxes the rigor of the strict Pareto 
test by analyzing whether the benefits gained from a particular project or regulation 
are enough that they can compensate the losers and still have some left over for 
themselves—although no actual compensation is required.222 
In sum, the theoretical application of welfare economics to the protection from 
liability under the conscience clause—which is analogous to a no-duty regime 
under tort law—does not appear to be supported by the normative economic 
approach of welfare economics due to a failure to maximize individuals’ well-
being. 
D.  A Pre-Emptive Response to Deontological Concerns 
In brief, this section addresses potential critiques of the application of welfare 
economics to resolve the pharmacist conscience clause issue.  Some legal scholars 
question the application of economic analysis to policy questions that arguably 
contain moral factors or moral evaluations.223  In their scholarship, Eyal Zamir and 
Barak Medina explain:  
[D]eontological theories view the goodness of outcomes as a morally relevant 
factor, but not as the only inherently important one . . . . They contain constraints 
on attaining the best outcomes and at the same time allow people to (sometimes) 
pursue their own interests and the interests of people dear to them or belonging to 
their group, even if such a pursuit conflicts with attaining the overall good.224   
Scholarship in this area analyzes the conflict between economic efficiency analysis, 
which looks to individuals’ well-being, and deontological analysis, which 
maintains that an individual’s interest should be pursued even if it conflicts with 
obtaining the overall maximization of social welfare.225 
Applied to pharmacist conscience clauses, a deontological argument could be 
that a refusing pharmacist’s religious views that birth control or drugs developed 
through stem-cell research are morally wrong and that no dollar or utility value can 
or should be applied to this personal viewpoint in order to conduct an economic 
                                                                                                     
 221. See MISHAN, supra note 175, at 386, 390; see also ALDER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 6: 
Our argument is that CBA is best defended as a welfarist decision procedure.  Cost-
benefit analysis is justified as a decision procedure to the extent that it advances overall 
well-being—that is, the well-being of the public generally, if not necessarily every 
member of the public—relative to alternative decision procedures, including the null case 
of doing nothing. 
Id. 
 222. ALDER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 10-11, 22. 
 223. See Richard S. Markovits, On the Relevance of Economic Efficiency Conclusions, 29 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1, 26-34 (2001) (arguing deficiencies of the application of economic-efficiency analysis); 
Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with 
Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CAL. L. REV. 323, 329-43 (2008) (critiquing consequentialism). 
 224. Zamir & Medina, supra note 223, at 343. 
 225. A large body of scholarship addresses the conflict between consequentialism and deontology.  
This debate is beyond the scope of this Article.  This section of the Article is meant to show that a strict 
application of deontology does not necessarily negate the promotion of a negligence regime.  Further, 
welfare economics can consider the preferences of pharmacists.   
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analysis.  One response to this argument is that the application of welfare 
economics to determine whether pharmacist conscience clauses maximize 
individuals’ well-being does not violate an individual’s religious beliefs.  Any adult 
who is opposed to birth control or drugs developed through stem cell research is 
not required to take the medication.  That is, the application of welfare economics 
to pharmacist conscience clauses does not violate an individual’s autonomy with 
respect to his or her personal feelings and values associated with these drugs.  If a 
person is opposed to these types of drugs, he or she does not have to take the 
medication.  Thus, the individual who is opposed to certain drugs can act in a way 
that maintains his or her moral integrity by choosing not to become a pharmacist 
and not to take certain drugs.226  In this way, an objecting person’s autonomy is 
preserved.227  The preservation of autonomy, however, does not give an individual 
the right to impose his or her religious beliefs onto someone else. 
Further, the decision to become a pharmacist is volitional.  There is no 
requirement that any individual has to become a pharmacist.  Ex ante, a person 
considering whether to become a pharmacist knows that part of the profession is 
dispensing FDA-approved drugs.  Society could not function if every profession 
allowed exemptions for any and all moral beliefs. 228  As an analogy, it would be 
difficult to allow exemptions for a surgical resident, who is also a Jehovah’s 
Witness, which allow the resident to refuse to provide a patient with a needed 
blood transfusion due to the resident’s personal or religious beliefs.229  It is unlikely 
                                                                                                     
 226. See, e.g., Zamir & Medina, supra note 223, at 344 (“While consequentialism judges acts 
according to whether they bring about the best state of affairs, deontology judges acts according to 
whether the actors conduct themselves in ways that maintain their moral integrity.”). 
 227. Some may argue that the autonomy of the pharmacist is restricted, for example, even if it is in 
choosing a profession.  The Author thanks a colleague for raising this important issue.  However, this 
problem can be addressed in a cost benefit analysis.  To make an analogy, restrictions on places where 
persons are allowed to smoke affect a smoker’s autonomy and ability to enjoy smoking.  For a non-
smoker, however, the restrictions on smoking may increase their enjoyment.  As described in E.J. 
Misham’s treatise on cost-benefit analysis, the smoker and non-smoker are not on equal footing: “In 
accordance with the liberal maxim, the freedom of any man, say, to smoke what he wants and where he 
wants is conceded-but along with the critical proviso that his smoking take place in circumstances which 
do not reduce the welfare of others.”  MISHAN, supra note 175, at 447.  This rationale can be applied to 
pharmacist conscience clauses.  One argument could be that even if the autonomy of choosing a 
profession is restricted because a pharmacist can be held liable for refusing to fill a prescription for a 
non-medical reason, the refusing pharmacist is not on equal footing with the patient that is refused their 
prescription because there is a reduction in the welfare of the patients. 
 228. Zamir & Medina, supra note 223, at 347.  Zamir and Medina discuss the consequentialist 
response to the application of moderate deontology to personal moral theory versus the application to 
legal policymakers:   
[I]t has been argued that the distinctions central to at least some versions of deontology, 
such as the doing/allowing and intending/foreseeing, are not relevant in the public sphere.  
This is because, unlike a private person, the state bears responsibility for the well-being 
of all, and because the motivations for collective and institutional decisions are often 
unclear and even conflicting.   
Id.  Zamir and Medina, however, do not support this argument.  See id. 
 229. Jehovah’s Witnesses, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jehovah’s_Witnesses (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2010) (“Jehovah’s Witnesses are best known for their door-to-door preaching, distribution of 
literature such as The Watchtower and Awake!, and for their refusal of military service and blood 
transfusions even in life-threatening situations.”).  See also Jehovah’s Witness, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
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that a hospital or residency program would be required to accommodate the 
refusing resident’s personal beliefs about blood transfusions.  Indeed, this 
hypothetical supports the application of Title VII to employers such that employers 
are only required to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs so long as the 
accommodation is de minimis.  Further, religious beliefs do not trump all other 
considerations.  In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court has stated that states 
must adopt laws with a secular purpose.230    
Deontological concerns may address the following problem.  Suppose a small-
town pharmacist, who is opposed to stem cell research, refuses to fill any 
prescriptions for a new medication for diabetes because the drug was developed 
through stem cell research.  On the other hand, suppose 100 patients in this same 
small town are not able to obtain their diabetes medication.  This scenario creates a 
deontological constraint.  Whose moral position is more important?  The 
pharmacist who doesn’t want to fill the prescription or the patients who suffer—
and maybe even die—because they cannot receive their medication?231  Even if it is 
just one patient who cannot receive his or her medication, who is in a worse 
position—the patient or the pharmacist?  Welfare economics can address this 
problem, to some extent, because the preferences of each side can be included in 
the calculation.232 
A final note on this Article’s brief response to potential philosophical concerns 
is that the law seeks to obtain practical results.233  It is not that the religious 
concerns of the refusing pharmacists shouldn’t be acknowledged, it’s that the 
preferences of the pharmacists who want legal protection from liability for refusing 
to fill prescriptions should not bootstrap lawmakers and judges in cases where a 
refusing pharmacist interferes with a patient’s right to FDA-approved 
medications.234  Individuals’ religious rights are protected under the First 
Amendment, but this does not mean the law must conform to every religious 
                                                                                                     
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/302393/Jehovahs-Witness (last visited Nov. 
11, 2010). 
 230. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (defining elements of the Lemon Test and 
reviewing Establishment Clause jurisprudence).  Another argument, as discussed previously in Part 
V.C., could be made that the objecting pharmacist’s preference is an objectively bad preference. 
 231. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simmons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 
273, 292 n.68 (1996) (criticizing consequentialist arguments, but acknowledging potential deontological 
constraints). 
 232. Cf. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 200, at 156-57 (addressing deontological criticisms of cost-
benefit analysis and conceding that cost-benefit analysis does not track deontological values.  The 
authors state that cost-benefit analysis “is not a superprocedure” and that deontological “considerations 
(to the extent they exist) need to be brought to bear on agency choice through decision rules other than 
[cost-benefit analysis]”). 
  One way to calculate the pharmacist’s preference is to utilize the marginal value of the 
preference.  That is, the first time a pharmacist refuses may have one value, but the second, third, etc. 
time may have less value.  The Author thanks a colleague for suggesting the use of marginal value to 
calculate the pharmacist’s preference. 
 233. See Michel Rosenfeld, Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpretation: Posner’s and Rorty’s 
Justice Without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 97, 104-05 (1996) (discussing 
the difference between philosophy and law and stating that the law “must aim for workable solutions 
that make a real difference in the empirical world”).  Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC 
CHOICES 86-87 (1978) (discussing the application of nonmarket mechanisms to tragic choices). 
 234. Cf. Rosenfeld, supra note 233, at 111 (describing Posner’s approach to pragmatism). 
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thought of any individual.235  According to the theoretical application of welfare 
economics as described above, a negligence regime maximizes individuals’ well-
being.236  As professionals—whether a doctor or a pharmacist—the best interest of 
the health and safety of the patient, according to standard medical practices, should 
be followed.  
E.  Current Alternative Proposals Do Not Maximize Individuals’ Well-Being 
As discussed in Part V, Section C, the common law, or state licensing 
provisions, can establish that the standard of care for pharmacists is to fill all valid 
and legal prescriptions—that is, the level of care is defined by the gatekeeper 
functions of the profession.  A court may decide that the refusal to fill a 
prescription for religious reasons fails to meet the standard of care and hold a 
pharmacist liable for this refusal.  Put differently, a pharmacist would fail to meet 
the professional standard of care should a pharmacist refuse to fill a prescription for 
any non-medical reason.  The common law approach to tort liability should 
accomplish the goal of maximizing individuals’ well-being in light of this standard.     
Other proposals, as described below, promote alternative approaches to ensure 
that patients receive their prescription drugs.  These proposals, however, contain 
certain practical problems that potentially make them less ideal than the common 
law negligence approach. 
1.  Seamless Delivery 
One proposed policy is to place the burden on the pharmacy to require 
seamless delivery of all medications without the patient knowing that a particular 
pharmacist personally objects to use of the drug.237  Described as ‘stepping away’ 
rather than ‘stepping in the way,’ this policy requires that a pharmacy establish a 
system where at least one pharmacist is on duty at all times who will fill all 
prescriptions.238  A recent bill proposed in Pennsylvania would place the onus on 
pharmacies to ensure the seamless delivery of stocked drugs.239  California enacted 
                                                                                                     
 235. Cf. id. 
 236. This Article does not propose that an economic approach to any question of law will always be 
correct.  It is possible and conceivable that an economic approach will have a result that is diametrically 
opposed to the preservation of certain rights.  Arguably, any approach to law has limitations.  Cf. id. at 
122 (describing Posner’s approach as looking to “the United States Constitution to curtail the most 
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a statute addressing seamless delivery.240  Likewise, legislation aimed at ensuring 
all valid prescriptions are filled by the pharmacy, as opposed to the pharmacist, has 
been introduced at the federal level.241  These pieces of legislation attempt to adopt 
a middle ground whereby a prescription would be filled without delay and a patient 
would never know that a particular pharmacist may personally object to dispensing 
the medication. 
At first glance, this appears to be a suitable compromise to all sides.  Notions 
of fairness are satisfied: a pharmacist retains the right of refusing to dispense, yet 
the patient still receives the medication.  In practice, however, seamless delivery is 
problematic.242  First, it assumes that all pharmacies, including rural ones, will 
financially be able to support having multiple pharmacists on duty, if needed.  
Second, a pharmacy could decide that it only wants to have one pharmacist on duty 
at any given time and will therefore only hire a pharmacist who will fill all 
prescriptions.  Potentially, a pharmacist with religious objections could argue that 
this constitutes religious discrimination—albeit this is probably a weak 
argument.243  Third, logistical problems exist.  For example, the pharmacist that 
will fill all prescriptions may be sick one day, or may need time away for personal 
reasons.  Under this scenario, any particular pharmacy would need multiple back-
up pharmacists to ensure the seamless delivery of drugs.  Fourth, a pharmacy may 
determine that the requirement to always have one pharmacist on duty that will fill 
all prescriptions is too onerous and simply decide not to stock the controversial 
medications.  For example, albeit under different circumstances, Wal-Mart decided 
not to carry EC.244  Wal-Mart ultimately changed its policy, after pressure by state 
officials to sell EC.245  No reason exists, however, not to believe that other 
pharmacies—particularly independent pharmacies in small towns—would opt to 
avoid the conflict altogether and refuse to carry certain drugs.  Fifth, seamless 
delivery may be a particularly difficult solution in states that have laws giving 
pharmacists the legal authority to prescribe and dispense EC.246  In these scenarios, 
patients are interviewed and counseled by a pharmacist.  If the pharmacist agrees 
the patient meets the clinical criteria for EC, the pharmacist can write and fill the 
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prescription.247  This system is an important step forward for women who need EC 
because of the time-sensitivity of effectiveness of the medication.  It also, however, 
expands the role of the pharmacist and potentially increases all the burdens 
discussed above on a pharmacy to ensure that a pharmacist is on duty at all times to 
prescribe and dispense all medications. 
Seamless delivery also feeds into the problem associated with expansion of 
conscience clauses as applied to drugs developed through controversial biomedical 
research.  Some pharmacists may not be willing to fill prescriptions for assisted 
suicide, while others object to birth control, while others in the future may object to 
newly discovered drugs developed through stem cell research.  Pharmacies may 
end up in a quagmire and find it too difficult to have pharmacists on duty at all 
times to dispense drugs for all medications.  This makes the decision not to carry 
controversial medications a more attractive choice for these pharmacies. 
The seamless delivery proposal exemplifies where a policy decision solely 
consisting of notions of fairness does not necessarily maximize individuals’ well-
being.  Upon an examination of the potential practical problems that can be 
encountered with a system of seamless delivery, it appears that the patients 
continue to be the injured party and the refusing pharmacists continue as the 
injuring party, resembling the problems associated with a no-liability regime as 
described above.  
Welfare economics would not support seamless delivery because it reduces 
individuals’ well-being.  That is, proponents of seamless delivery consider the 
preferences of the pharmacist who does not want to face liability for refusing to fill 
a prescription.  The objecting pharmacist’s preference, however, has a detrimental 
impact on the well-being of the patients who will have de facto difficulty in filling 
prescriptions, as described above.248  Thus, the aggregate benefit to social welfare 
of having prescriptions filled will greatly exceed any gain to the refusing 
pharmacist.249  In sum, the practical problems with seamless delivery mimic the no-
liability regime of conscience clauses—a policy that is not supported by welfare 
economics. 
2.  Duty-to-Fill Legislation 
Duty-to-fill legislation requires all pharmacies and pharmacists to dispense 
legal prescriptions.250  This type of legislation allows the pharmacists to know, ex 
ante, the potential consequences of their actions should they refuse to fill a 
prescription due to personal or religious beliefs.251  That is, the duty-to-fill 
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legislation allows the pharmacists to select the level of care to take—knowing the 
consequences of their actions.252 
Although the application of welfare economics in the above theoretical model 
demonstrates that a common law negligence regime can maximize individuals’ 
well-being, some states have reacted to the idea that a pharmacist may escape 
liability for refusing to fill prescriptions by enacting rules that statutorily establish 
liability for refusing pharmacists.  Under the theoretical model of pharmacist 
liability as proposed in this Article, statutory duty-to-fill legislation is not needed 
unless: (1) the states refuse to repeal already enacted pharmacist conscience clause 
legislation; (2) the states continue to enact conscience clause legislation; or (3) the 
courts or state licensing boards do not want to apply welfare economics to 
determine the standard of care.253  In any event, a discussion of duty-to-fill 
legislation is warranted in consideration of the existence any of the above 
scenarios.    
As mentioned earlier, some states have duty-to-fill rules.  Illinois, for example, 
issued an emergency duty-to-fill rule after a pharmacist in downtown Chicago 
refused to fill a prescription for a contraceptive.254  The Governor stated that “[o]ur 
regulation says that if a woman goes to a pharmacy with a prescription for birth 
control, the pharmacy is not allowed to discriminate against who they sell it to and 
who they don’t . . . . No delays.  No hassles.  No lectures.  Just fill the 
prescription.”255  Specifically, the Governor said he was taking a stand against a 
growing trend of anti-choice pharmacists.256  This policy is a way to ensure that all 
legal prescriptions are filled;257 however, it does not require the pharmacy to carry 
the medication at issue.     
Opponents of duty-to-fill legislation argue that it turns pharmacists into robots 
that are required to fill all prescriptions, without respect to their gatekeeper 
function.258  They argue that pharmacists would have to fill all legal prescriptions 
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without delay regardless of whether the pharmacist detects potential allergies or 
adverse drug-related interactions.259  This argument in opposition to duty-to-fill 
legislation is a red herring.  It does not impact the importance of applying 
pharmacological knowledge of drug allergies and interactions.  Indeed, as these 
concerns were presented to the Illinois Governor and the Illinois Department of 
Financial and Professional Regulation, they issued a clarification statement that the 
duty-to-fill rule was not to interfere with a pharmacist’s responsibility to conduct a 
utilization review.260  
The language of duty-to-fill legislation can easily be drafted to ensure the 
gatekeeper function of a pharmacist is not compromised.  The Pharmacy Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, introduced in the Federal Senate, for example, directly 
addresses the obligation to fill valid prescriptions, while protecting the gatekeeper 
function: 
The pharmacy ensures that each valid prescription is filled with unnecessary delay 
or other interference, consistent with the normal timeframe for filling prescriptions 
[and] . . . [n]othing in this section shall prohibit a pharmacy from refusing to 
dispense a prescribed item, in accordance with standard pharmacy practice, if there 
is a valid medical concern that such prescribed item will cause problems due to 
therapeutic duplications, drug-disease contraindications, drug interactions 
(including serious interactions with prescription or over-the-counter medications), 
incorrect dosage or duration of drug treatment, drug-allergy interactions, or drug 
abuse or misuse.  Any refusal to dispense a prescribed item must be based on 
generally accepted practice among health care providers.261 
In this way, the professional gatekeeper function is protected and the patient 
receives the prescribed medication.262   
If, however, states refuse to repeal pharmacist conscience clause legislation 
and continue to pass pharmacist conscience clause legislation, the federal 
government may need to enact duty-to-fill legislation to pre-empt state behavior.  
That is, the state conscience clause legislation will carve out an exception to the 
common law approach of the application of a professional standard of care.  If this 
is the case, then the current duty-to-fill legislation proposed at the federal level 
should contain additional safeguards.      
Although a step in the right direction, duty-to-fill legislation must place an 
obligation on a pharmacy to carry any controversial medication.  The duty-to-fill 
legislation proposed in the Federal Senate, for example, includes a provision that 
the pharmacy must ensure that it orders an item that is not in stock or transfer the 
prescription.263  Any duty-to-fill legislation, however, should include language that 
a pharmacy cannot refuse to stock or order drugs due to any personal or religious 
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beliefs.  This proposed addition maximizes individuals’ well being because the 
pharmacies could also be the injuring party.   
This is an important point because Catholic hospitals are the largest group of 
non-profit hospitals and are often the only hospital in rural areas.264  Many Catholic 
hospitals adhere to religious doctrines when establishing policies, including 
performing abortions or providing EC to rape victims.265  A study of Catholic 
hospitals showed that only 28% provided EC to rape victims.266  This is an 
alarming statistic considering the American Medical Association considers EC to 
be standard care for a rape victim.267  By amending any duty-to-fill legislation to 
set the standard of care to include a requirement that a pharmacy must stock or 
order all FDA approved medications, both the pharmacy and the pharmacist can 
face liability for refusing to fill a valid prescription due to any non-medical reason.   
Further, any duty-to-fill legislation should include a private cause of action.268  
If the states continue to adopt, enact and/or enforce pharmacist conscience clause 
legislation, then the federal government will need to enact duty-to-fill legislation to 
pre-empt state behavior.  In this way, both the government and the citizens can 
monitor the proper enforcement of this legislation. 
In some respects, a pharmacist conscience clause that stops any patient—male 
or female—from filling a prescription exemplifies and amplifies that patients are 
injured by this legislation.  To date it is women who are overwhelmingly affected 
by conscience clause legislation because it is women who fill prescriptions for 
contraceptives and EC.269  Historically, women gained equal rights through the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.270  Once men are refused prescriptions 
for diabetes, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, and heart disease, the debate surrounding 
conscience clause legislation will raise issues that are no longer based on 
reproductive rights, women’s rights, or only affect a subset of the population.  
These types of difficulties can be included in the normative application of welfare 
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economics. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The ramifications of conscience clause legislation run far beyond the number 
of instances of refusals to fill prescriptions or the desire to accommodate 
pharmacists who are personally against specific medications.  This type of 
legislation could be expanded to many other drugs and areas of research and it does 
not have a net benefit to social welfare.  
An analysis of pharmacist conscience clauses is particularly ripe at this time as 
the Obama Administration recently announced its support for the federal funding of 
embryonic stem cell research.  Expansive pharmacist conscience clause legislation 
could protect pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions for drugs developed 
through stem cell research.  
Legal scholarship in this area debates the fairness of conscience clauses.  The 
debate appears to be at an impasse and is, in any event, unsatisfying.  This Article 
proposes the application of welfare economics as the guiding principle in policy 
determinations and presents an alternative approach to the current debate 
surrounding pharmacist conscience clauses.  
The theoretical application of welfare economics demonstrates that pharmacist 
conscience clause legislation may not maximize individuals’ well-being.  A 
common law approach, whereby a pharmacist may be held liable for refusing to fill 
a prescription for a non-medical reason, most likely can reach the appropriate 
balance to minimize total social costs.  If however, states refuse to repeal 
pharmacist conscience clause legislation or states continue to pass pharmacist 
conscience clause legislation, duty-to-fill legislation, which places a statutory duty 
on pharmacies or pharmacists to fill valid prescriptions, may be needed.  If this is 
the case, duty-to-fill legislation should include a provision that pharmacies cannot 
refuse to carry any FDA approved medication due to any religious or personal 
objections.     
Importantly, duty-to-fill legislation does not alter any of the professional 
responsibilities and gatekeeper functions of a pharmacist.  The pharmacist’s job to 
ensure the prescription is valid and legal remains.  The expertise required for drug 
allergies or interactions is still a critical component of the profession.  Interesting to 
note in this debate is that the word science is within the word conscience. 
